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The Temporal Rivalries of Human Rights
FLEUR JOHNS*
ABSTRACT
Nation-states' "boundaries" are produced in time: around official
working hours and terms of office, for instance, and in the historico-
mythic "life of the nation." Global human rights practices affirm and
depend on nation-states' temporal authority, while also calling that
authority into question. In different ways, global markets do likewise. In
recent decades, the ubiquity of both finance capital and international
human rights law, among other factors, may have encouraged the
fracturing of time into intervals of ever-decreasing length. Temporal
authority premised on the long-term seems to have declining purchase,
even as historicism and futurism abound, discouraging some modes of
state-based politics associated with the long-term. In this context,
international human rights law advocates eem increasingly preoccupied
with the propagation of human rights concerns in "real time." This
orientation carries some peril, especially vis-&-vis its articulation with
the temporalities of global finance capital. Even so, there is still time for
political intervention in this uneven temporal terrain. Such intervention
may be occasioned, this article argues, by reading international human
rights law anachronistically, and reactivating the times and rhythms of
the global economy, and of the nation-state, as political questions of the
first order.
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INTRODUCTION
"While the council remains an imperfect body, we have
seen distinct progress in terms of its ability to respond to
happenings in the world [with respect to human rights]
in real time," [the U.S. ambassador to the UN Human
Rights Council, Eileen Donahoe told reporters.] "There is
more shared common ground here than people realize."'
The "common ground" to which international human rights law lays
claim today is, at least in part, temporally comprised. That which
bearers and guardians of rights try to hold together is less any single
measure of value than a sense of unavoidable coincidence in more or
less the same time frame (an effort that often fails, as discussed below).
That this coincidental time frame may be striated zonally, squared
against disparate pasts and futures, and punctuated by events evoking
variable degrees and durations of concern, need not alter its scaffolding
cogency in and for international human rights law, if only it could be
sustained. Much has been made, for instance, of prospects for global
human rights to unfold "in real time"-that is, amid the sense of
informational concurrence to which rapid data processing, crowd-
sourced reporting, and remote-sensing capacities afford ever more ready
access.
2
Technological capacities notwithstanding, co-occurrence in time at
any scale may arguably have become harder to sustain in recent
decades, especially on the temporal terrain of statehood. Scholarly
literature has recorded a "declining temporal authority of states" before
the rhythms of global finance capital.3 In light of such claims, this
article asks the following questions: to what extent, if at all, does
international human rights law install or assert rival temporalities to
those commonly associated with, and mobilized for and through, the
nation-state? How might any such rival temporalities relate to the times
1. Editorial, The United Nations' Human 'Rights' Council, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2011, at A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinionslthe-united-nations-
human-rights-council2011/03/25/AFSRyPeBstory.html.
2. See, e.g., Joanna Naples-Mitchell, Perspectives of UN Special Rapporteurs on Their
Role: Inherent Tensions and Unique Contributions to Human Rights, 15 INT'L J. HUM. RTS.
232, 232-33, 244 (2011). See generally Real Time Definition, OED ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/238662 (last visited Dec. 2014) ("The
actual time during which a process or event occurs, esp. one analysed by a computer, in
contrast to time subsequent o it when processing may be done, a recording replayed,
etc.").
3. Wayne Hope, Conflicting Temporalities: State, Nation, Economy and Democracy
Under Global Capitalism, 18 TIME & SOCY 62, 78 (2009).
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and timings of global finance capital? What, moreover, may be some
ramifications of such rivalries for those engaged in international legal
work?
Part I of this article reviews temporal dimensions of international
law writ broadly, including international human rights law. It considers
some of the functions of time and timing in and for international law
and the different forms that international legal temporality may take.
In Part II, comparison is made to time and timings characteristic of the
nation-state and the practice of assembling and maintaining nation-
state authority temporally. In relation to both of these temporal styles
or endeavors, this article then, in Part III, reflects on the declining
credibility of the long-term over the course of the twentieth century,
observing that there may have been, in many respects, contraction in
the temporal intervals of public concern and experience.
4
Against this background, as I argue in Part IV, international human
rights law is advanced as a somewhat untimely discipline, not
subscribing consistently either to the temporal templates of the nation-
state, or to the accelerated rhythms and shortened spans of the global
market. Instead, international human rights law doctrine and
practice-exemplified here by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)-seem to foster temporal fitfulness.5 At times,
international human rights law work links, sequences, and periodizes;
elsewhere it seeks to arrest a temporal flow. Paradoxically, this fitful
temporality of international human rights law may be less about
confirming rightful time-a temporality that is "on the right path"-
than about insistently evoking the "disjuncture of the unjust" through
repeated alignments with, and disarticulations from, other temporal
registers.
6
For purposes of this argument, temporalities characteristic of the
nation-state, global finance capital or the global market, and
international human rights law, respectively, are sketched quite
schematically and posited as rivals, even as complicity and reliance
4. This is not a claim that may be verified or proven on the basis of material
presented in this article. Rather, this article relies, in Part III, upon scholarship drawn
from a range of fields that is suggestive of this prospect. Moreover, it is not essential to the
argument of this article that concern for the long-term be in decline as a general matter,
for all times and for all peoples everywhere. Examples of countering tendencies are
doubtless readily available.
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doec. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (detailing a series of agreed-upon human
rights propositions, focused primarily on freedom and equality).
6. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF
MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 20-22 (Peggy Kamuf trans., Routledge 1994)
(1993).
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among them are made apparent. In so doing, this article's aims are two-
fold. On one hand, this triptychal redescription is intended to sharpen
the visibility of relations between these phenomena, and thereby to
counter any sense that the discipline of international human rights law
militates, necessarily, against the nation-state or the market.7 On the
other hand, their stylized separation is designed to recover some
prospect that international human rights law might, nonetheless, retain
rivalrous potential-that is, that it might still provoke the disjuncture of
the unjust alluded to above.
In Part V, finally, this article will explore how international human
rights law as a discipline remains, nonetheless, preoccupied with trying
to engender regular temporal rhythms more or less of its own
production. In past decades, this has been bound up with the
professionalization and global propagation of the human rights
enterprise. More recently, however, effort has been directed towards
that enterprise's decentralization and reseeding, including through the
cultivation of itinerant temporalities capable of lodging within and
moving with a crowd. It is with a critique of this aspiration-for human
rights capable of gathering in "real time"-that this article will close,
amid speculation as to what this might demand of those who would
engage in international human rights law work and those whose rights
they would defend.
I. TEMPORALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Time is often cast-alongside space-as international law's
background, or as the medium in which international legal relations
and conduct are "set."8 This casting is related to the propensity, since
the nineteenth century, to set law in context amid the social.9 "Society..
7. For evidence of a still-subsisting tendency to characterize international human
rights law as opposed to the imperatives of the nation-state and the global market, see,
e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty" 25 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 31
(1995); Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human
Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51, 53 (1999).
8. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Trust and the Temporalities of Law, 46 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 2 (2014).
9. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 19-22 (David
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing the formalistic, classical legal thought
of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century and the socially oriented legal
thought of the twentieth century, and how these two schools gave way to modern legal
thought). See generally BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005) (making a sustained critique of the enterprise of "social
explanation," including by reference to "context").
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. [effects] a conceptual union of time and place"; in many scholars'
accounts, law inhabits this unity as a phenomenon in and of the social.10
As Carol Greenhouse has shown, the temporalities of law's social
settings-and hence law's own temporalities-have often been thought
by recourse to Emile Durkheim's notion of collective, symbolic "social
time."'" Yet timing is also a technique of international law:
international law is a shaper of time and a connector and divider of
times. International law sequences time and distributes humans and
nonhumans within those sequences, according to narratives of progress,
modernity, and development.'2 International law maps time onto the
surface of the Earth: Greenwich Mean Time and the international
dateline are products of international treaty making and the work of
international organizations. 13 International law gathers people into the
urgent temporality of crisis; indeed, some are lawfully consigned to
conditions of "permanent crisis."14 It also fences people in deadlines, and
channels work in a far more mundane register: by establishing
continuous cycles of reporting and review under international human
rights treaties, for instance.
15
International legal temporalities are often linear and oriented
around a point in time: the definite duration or the time-limited
procedure; that is, the time of calendar and clock. Consider the dating
and timing of treaties' entry into force, for example, or the insistence
that International Court of Justice decisions bind only those who come
10. Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1638 (1989).
11. Carol J. Greenhouse, Time's Up, Timed Out: Reflections on Social Time and Legal
Pluralism, 46 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 141, 141 (2014) (quoting EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen Fields trans., Free Press
1995) (1912)).
12. See generally THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW DISCOURSE (2010) (discussing and challenging what is labeled as progress in the
international law context).
13. See, e.g., Francis DeAk, Computation of Time in International Law, 20 AM J. INT'L
L. 502, 515 (1926); George Grafton Wilson, Editorial Comment, Time and International
Law, 34 AM J. INT'L L. 496, 497 (1940).
14. Massimiliano Tomba, Clash of Temporalities: Capital, Democracy, and Squares,
113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 353, 354 (2014); see Hilary Charlesworth, International Law): A
Discipline of Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REV. 377, 377 (2002) (discussing how international lawyers
focus on crises).
15. The Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights
Council is one prominent example. See generally Edward McMahon & Marta Ascherio, A
Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the UN
Human Rights Council, 18 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 231 (2012) (discussing the Universal
Periodic Review, a UN system by which states can make recommendations to each other
about human rights practices).
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before the court in a "particular case."16 Consider, too, Bin Cheng's
famous contraction of customary international lawmaking into instant
custom.17
Even so, international law speaks in and to durations of unspecified
length and nonlinear dimensions: in the jurisdictional notion of
"continuing acts" (where the conduct in question commenced before the
existence of the norm allegedly violated, but continued after it came into
effect);1s in limitations periods, which bar claims due to the passage of
time; and in the doctrine of intertemporal law, which requires "judicial
fact[s]" to be "appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with
[them]."19 International law also extricates itself recurrently from the
movement of time; international human rights law especially: it asserts
the timelessness of its concerns, all the while worrying incessantly
about its want of timeliness and its need to "catch up."
20
The temporalities of international law are thus multiple and
misaligned. Just as there is no "general history," so there is no general
temporality of international lawfulness.21  Indeed, assertions of
overarching, free-floating temporality remain troubling, insofar as they
prompt divergences to be experienced in terms of objectively ascribed
"backwardness" and "advancement," the harms of which are well
documented.22 If advocates of international law nonetheless exhibit a
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993; see ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 168-71 (2d ed., 2007); see
also Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55, 59-69 (2009)
(breaking down temporality into points in time and duration, for legal purposes).
17. See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World,
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 536 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983)
(describing the Barcelona Declaration as an example of the author's belief that
international law is created instantly by changes in what states accept and subscribe to as
the law).
18. Rosalyn Higgins, Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem,
46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 506 (1997).
19. United States v. Netherlands, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83, at 845 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
20. See, e.g., Christoph Bezemek et al., Topics in International Human Rights
Protection, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 127, 127 (2013) (describing freedom of
communication as a "timeless .... never outdated topic in human rights protection"); Colin
B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 149, 184 (2001) ("Normally, delay is the rule in the
formation of international law.").
21. JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 50 (Alan Bass trans., Continuum 2d English ed.
2004) (1972) (commenting on Althusser's critique of an Hegelian notion of history).
22. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 189 (2005); cf. Louis Althusser, The Object of Capital, in READING CAPITAL 71, 106
(Ben Brewster trans., New Left Books 1970) (1968) ("[lit is only in the specific unity of the
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common temporal disposition, this may be discerned in the aspiration to
link up disparate times and timings-in the impulse to join things
together and thereby enjoin unlawfulness.
23
II. STATE TIMES
To a significant degree, these rivalrous international legal
temporalities pivot around the politico-legal figure of the nation-state
and the temporalities constituting and sustained by it. The "structure of
feeling" instilled by and for the nation-state has a significant temporal
dimension.24 The latter-the temporality of the national-has, in Saskia
Sassen's estimation, "remained submerged, an unnamed condition ...
partly because it is our given condition, the assumed temporality of
much social scientific practice" 25 and, I would add, much legal practice
as well. Nation-state time is produced in social and legal knowledge
practices, but often tends to be illegible to them.
26
Among those submerged temporalities, the generation of
"synchronic" experience-a sense of parallelism or simultaneity among
those spread across great distances and divergent geographic and life
conditions-has been essential to the nation-state's creation, prevalence
and endurance.27 Time had to be made cohabitable among scattered
strangers in order for the nation-state to attain the dominance that it
did between 1500 and 1800, and for humans to experience themselves
as nation-bound "populations" or aspirants to that status.28 It was only
through "an accumulation of technological innovations in the fields of
complex structure of the whole that we can think the concept of these so-called
backwardnesses, forwardnesses, survivals and unevennesses of development which co-
exist in the structure of the real historical present ...."). Note the "whole" here is a
contingent social formation: a "structural unity" that "contain[s] what can be called levels
or instances which are distinct and 'relatively autonomous' . . . [but nonetheless]
articulated with one another." Althusser, supra, at 97.
23. Cf. DERRIDA, supra note 6, at 25 ('The thinking of the jointure is also a thinking of
injunction.").
24. Ana Maria Alonso, The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation,
Nationalism and Ethnicity, 23 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 379, 386-90 (1994).
25. Saskia Sassen, Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a
Theorization, 12 PUB. CULTURE 215, 223 (2000).
26. Cf. Althusser, supra note 22, at 101 (discussing the "invisible time" of capitalist
economic production, and how that time system is not apparent to those in the system
creating it).
27. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 188 (rev. ed., 1991) (1983).
28. On the emergence of the phenomenon of the "population," see MICHEL FOUCAULT,
SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLftGE DE FRANCE 1977-1978, at
42-45, 66-79 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell, trans., 2007) (2004).
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shipbuilding, navigation, horology and cartography, mediated through
print-capitalism" that "this type of imagining [became] possible."
29
Yet state time has significant diachronic dimensions as well. Many
have shown the importance of the telling of history and myth to the
ongoing project of nation-state making and remaking.30 Indeed, this is
the way in which the temporality of nation-statehood has most
commonly been thought. As Tim Edensor has observed, "accounts of the
temporal constitution of national identities continue to focus upon
common traditions, myths of shared descent, and the linking of
historical and future narratives'31 Both historico-mythic time and the
presumed copresence of the nation-state in turn evoke and rely upon an
"ideological base time": an undifferentiated emptiness or unity, through
which people and things may pass, or in which they may be held for a
time.3
2
However empty it may seem, this "base time" underpinning the
authority of the nation-state is itself sequenced and sectioned according
to temporalities of office, planning, and indebtedness: temporalities
differentiated on their face. Such sequences include the term of service,
the duration of appointment, or the maturity of sovereign bonds. In
democratic states, time is parceled out according to the election cycle. In
all political settings, year-on-year budget cycles tend to set the national
rhythm. In most settings, furthermore, state time corresponds to
budgetary and policy planning periods of longer duration, both domestic
and international: five-year plans, for example, or the pre- and post-
2015 planning and measurement surrounding the Millennium
Development Goals.
33
National temporalities are comprised, too, of the everyday
reproduced mundanely as "experience"-the everyday of public
servants, for instance. This mode of temporality is most obviously
synchronic, but generates a sense of base time as well. Conventionally,
state time has been imagined as "slow moving" thanks to the "rule-
29. ANDERSON, supra note 27.
30. See, e.g., ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 66 (Univ. of Nev. Press 1993)
(1991).
31. Tim Edensor, Reconsidering National Temporalities: Institutional Times, Everyday
Routines, Serial Spaces and Synchronicities, 9 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 525, 527 (2006).
32. Althusser, supra note 22, at 104-05.
33. See, e.g., Peter T.Y. Cheung, China's Changing Regional Development: Trends,
Strategies and Challenges in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) Period, 53 ASIA PAC.
VIEWPOINT 1, 1 (2012); Francis Collins & David Galas, A New Five-Year Plan for the U.S.
Human Genome Project, 262 SCIENCE 43, 46 (1993); Chris Ham, Another Five Year Plan
for the NHS, 340 BRIT. MED. J. 5, 5-6 (2010); U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Millennium Development Goals and Post-2015 Development Agenda,
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml (last visited June 12, 2015).
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bound public accountability of governmental processes."34 Yet this
impression may have little or no grounding in the recent experience of
government employees under pressure from incentive structures,
efficiency demands, and austerity measures.35 Increasingly, state time
is the defined contract period of a consultant's assignment. Likewise, it
may be inapt to characterize contemporary democracy as proceeding at
the "leisurely pace" of "deliberation.'36 Rather, it seems just as fitting to
temporalize democracy by reference to the 150- to 250-hertz refresh rate
of an LCD screen.
Mundane temporalities comprising "base" experiences of nationhood
are not, moreover, solely the preserve of those in governmental employ.
The everyday of state time is composed just as much of broadcasting
schedules, speed restrictions, opening and trading hours, and the cycle
of national holidays: all established by national or subnational law.
37
Through both official and unofficial routinization, "national
synchronicity is achieved [among a populace] through temporal customs
about when and where specific social practices should occur."38 Yet
temporalities of national habit also diverge: the public holiday may pass
without notice for those on "flexible" work schedules and those engaged
in subsistence production or other forms of unpaid work.39 The
maintenance of state time may be less about the synchronization (or
making diachronic) of time across any one national population than the
attempt to smooth over irrepressible temporal disjuncture or to organize
34. Sassen, supra note 25, at 224.
35. See generally DONALD F. KErTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA (2002) (explaining that the study
of public administration is out of sync with its actual practice); Stephen Bach, Shrinking
the State or the Big Society? Public Service Employment Relations in an Era of Austerity,
43 INDUS. REL. J. 399 (2012) (considering the origins of Big Society and its consequences
on public service and the workforce in the UK); Peter Leisink & Stephen Bach, Economic
Crisis and Municipal Public Service Employment: Comparing Developments in Seven EU
Member States, 20 TRANSFER 327 (2014) (examining the impact of austerity policies on
municipal employment).
36. Contra Sheldon Wolin, What Time Is It?, THEORY & EVENT (1997),
https:/muse.jhu.eduljournals/theory-andevent/vOO111. lwolin.html.
37. See Edensor, supra note 31, at 530-31.
38. Id. at 534.
39. See generally Nancy Folbre, The Care Economy in Africa: Subsistence Production
and Unpaid Care, 23 J. AFR. ECON. (SUPPLEMENT 1) i128 (2014) (analyzing the care
economy in Africa, including subsistence farming and caring for dependents); Janice
Peterson & Barbara Wiens-Tuers, Work Time, Gender, and Inequality: The Conundrums
of Flexibility, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 387 (2014) (discussing flexible work schedules in the
United States, with a particular focus on the impact on women workers).
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such disjunctions in and around relatively stable spatio-temporal
containers.
40
III. THE DEMISE OF THE LONG-TERM
Among the conditions of possibility for these contemporary legal
temporalities and their spatio-temporal organization is the declining
credibility of long-term planning and prediction over the course of the
twentieth century. This decline has political, epistemological, cultural,
technological, and economic dimensions.
Politically and epistemologically, the figure of the long-term planner
and the viability of his or her predictive foresight has come under attack
from both the right and the left. Friedrich Hayek famously cast doubt on
the capacity of any human to comprehend or direct the "catallaxy" or
"spontaneous order of the market" over any length of time.41 Hayek was
not, of course, averse to planning, provided that it was "good planning."
That is, it needed to be "wise and foresighted" enough to focus on
enhancing competition rather then prescribing distributive outcomes to
be realized at an "appointed time," or insisting on common ideals or
objects to be pursued by all "at the same time."42 In Hayek's account,
unification in planned time signified a loss of liberty through
circumscription of choice, as well as a disregard for the imperfection of
knowledge. Hayek's purported adversary in economic thought, John
Maynard Keynes, likewise cast the future as radically unknowable and
highlighted the relativity of time measurement.
43
On the left of social and political thought, temporality has been
fractured and particularized. In Louis Althusser's account, for instance,
"peculiar time[s] and histor[ies]" were rethought as the outcome of
distinct modes of production.44  Althusser's paired critiques of
40. See Tomba, supra note 14, at 355 (discussing the difficulties that the diverging
temporalities of democratic processes and capital present o governments).
41. 2 F. A. HAYEK, The Market Order or Catallaxy, in LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY
107, 108-09, 128-29 (1976).
42. F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 36, 55, 104 (1944).
43. Cf. Mogens Ove Madsen, Keynes's Early Cognition of the Concept of Time, in
KEYNES'S GENERAL THEORY FOR TODAY 98, 106-09 (Jesper Jespersen & Mogens Ove
Madsen eds., 2012) (discussing how Keynes developed a dynamic notion of time). Hayek
and Keynes are described as purported adversaries because the relationship of neoliberal
(including Hayekian) thought to Keynesian thought and policy cannot be characterized as
one of straightforward opposition. Hayek's ally Milton Friedman emphasized, for example,
"what a great economist Keynes was and how much more [Friedman] sympathize[d] with
his approach and aims than those of many of [Keynes'] followers." Milton Friedman,
Comments on the Critics, 80 J. POL. ECON. 906, 908 (1972).
44. Althusser, supra note 22, at 99.
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empiricism and historicism demanded a notion of differential time that
could neither be read off the surface of events, nor understood as the
continuity in which events occurred. Rather, according to Samuel
Chambers, Althusser construed temporality as "emanating from the
structure of the social formation."
45
Communication and cultural practices have also reinforced a sense
of long-term planning as declining in cogency and coherence. In the
course of historicizing this decline (rather ironically), Frederic Jameson
has observed: "it is scarcely fair to expect long-term projections ... from
minds trained in the well-nigh synchronic habits of zero-sum calculation
and of keeping an eye on profits," all while subscribing to "pattern[s] of
immediacies" in daily life-calling people rather than making
appointments, for instance.46 To Jameson, the "end of temporality"
staged in art and literature after modernism, and an associated
"reduction to the present and ... to the body," express the unrealizable
aspirations of late capitalism.
47
However one casts the causal dice, "patterns of immediacies" have
certainly flourished and spread under late capitalism. Accelerated
processing capacities and remote-sensing and robotics technologies have
been coproduced with a just-in-time preoccupation in manufacturing,
distribution, labor, and servicing. As supply chains have dispersed
globally, temporal sequencing and coordination have demanded far
greater attention and effort than ever before. Logistics-the "banal and
technocratic management of the movement of stuff"4 -- may have
become "the central discipline of the contemporary world" in commercial
as much as in military endeavors.49 With this has thrived a sense of
time as among the elements of the "stuff' to be managed and moved,
typically with a view to minimizing stoppages and friction.5 0 That
"seamless" global supply chains often turn out to be "messy and violent"
in operation need not dissipate the sense of time as an endless series of
micro-instances to be smoothed, linked, and aligned. Indeed, awareness
of messiness and violence may, in fact, intensify such preoccupations.
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As noted at the outset, global financial practices have also
intensified this orientation towards intervals of ever-decreasing length.
45. Samuel A. Chambers, Untimely Politics avant la lettre: The Temporality of Social
Formations, 20 TIME & SOc'Y 197, 208 (2011).
46. Fredric Jameson, The End of Temporality, 29 CRITICAL INQUIRY 695, 705-07,
(2003).
47. Id. at 717.
48. DEBORAH COWEN, THE DEADLY LIFE OF LOGISTICS 4 (2014).
49. NIGEL THRIFT, NON-REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY: SPACE, POLITICS, AFFECT 95
(2008).
50. COWEN, supra note 48, at 93.
51. Id.
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As Wayne Hope has described, "[t]he real time profit making of
financialized capitalism preclude[s] reflection on the volatilities of
economic history and the uncertainties of future economic
developments" and creates conflict with "longer term rhythms of capital
accumulation centred upon production, commodity exchange and
aggregate demand."52 The increased popularity of mathematical
methods in finance from the 1970s onwards, and the rise of automated
trading, have also been associated with a contraction in time intervals
measured or modeled to the point of the infinitesimal. Continuous-time
methods, assuming that the value of particular variables is continuously
changing, have increasingly been deployed in the valuation of
derivatives and other financial instruments in asset pricing and
portfolio optimization.53 More recently, the use of software algorithms to
identify and execute transactions has come to dominate securities
trading.54 In such contexts "[m]illiseconds matter" to the realization of
arbitrage opportunities in pricing patterns only detectable by electronic
means.55 For finance capital, temporality has become less a dimension
to occupy than one to chase or flee.
IV. THE UNTIMELINESS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
International human rights law doctrine and practice are, in many
respects, temporally parasitic on the conditions and constructions
outlined above. Acts of asserting or claiming human rights protected by
international law are typically oriented towards one or more nation-
states. As such, human rights claims often entail affirmation of some
nationalist "rationalization of time," by evoking nationalist or
52. Wayne Hope, Crisis of Temporalities: Global Capitalism After the 2007-08
Financial Collapse, 20 TIME & SoC'Y 94, 101, 106 (2011); see also Hope, supra note 3, at 67
(criticizing trends in global capitalism and finance as setting the stage for currency crises).
This may be less the case in certain industries-in the energy and natural resources
sector, for instance-although these sectors may not be immune to managerial "short-
termism." See generally Kevin J. Laverty, Managerial Myopia or Systemic Short-termism?:
The Importance of Managerial Systems in Valuing the Long Term, 42 MGMT. DECISION 949
(2004) (examining organizational culture, processes, and routines to understand why
firms undervalue the long term when trading off between short-term and long-term
results).
53. See Suresh M. Sundaresan, Continuous-Time Methods in Finance: A Review and an
Assessment, 55 J. FIN. 1569, 1569 (2000).
54. See Donncha Kavanagh et al., Finance Past, Finance Future: A Brief Exploration of
the Evolution of Financial Practices, 9 MGMT. & ORG. HIST. 135, 142 (2014).
55. Id. at 142. See generally Donald MacKenzie, How to Make Money in Microseconds,
LONDON REV. BOOKS, May 19, 2011, at 16 (discussing the use of algorithms in stock
market trading, with a focus on how quickly they facilitate trades).
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protonationalist diachrony, for instance.56 One influential version of
disciplinary self-understanding has cast international human rights law
as the chastened European progeny of the Second World War and the
Holocaust. 57 Other versions confer on international human rights law a
more ancient national or protonational lineage-traceable to the Stoics
of Greek and Roman philosophy, medieval scholars of natural rights,
and the French, the American, and sometimes the Russian
Revolutions.5 8 Accounts along these lines may be in the process of being
usurped, among human rights historians, by a post-1970s periodization
focused on the United States.
5 9
International human rights law scholars and practitioners are
nonetheless at pains to adapt to the rhythms of global supply chains
and the lead-times of logistics. Increasingly, effort is directed towards
the insertion of tiny packets of human rights review along the length of
a global supply or value chain. Potentially open-ended claim-making
and negotiation must be condensed, accordingly, into relatively rapid-
fire certification or audit, as market movements are broken down into
interlaced milliseconds.60
International human rights law scholars and practitioners do,
nevertheless, exhibit some ambivalence about the submerged or
invisible temporalities of nation-state and capitalist economy, even as
they frequently pace their work according to those rhythms. At times, as
in the quote with which this article opened, human rights advocates set
an event-focused empiricism against such "background" temporalities.
56. Alonso, supra note 24, at 388.
57. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 4-5
(2001).
58. See, e.g., ADAM MCBETH ETAL., THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 36-58
(2011) (discussing the older legal traditions that influenced the idea of human rights). On
contending "precursors" advanced for human rights among scholars and practitioners,
including those mentioned here, see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY 11-43 (2010).
59. See MOYN, supra note 58, at 3-6 (noting how human rights came into popular
consciousness in the 1970s); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo:
The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
ScI. 231, 240-53 (2006) (discussing human rights with a primary focus on the United
States in the 1970s and 1980s); see also SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USES OF
HISTORY 86 (2014) ("[T]he lesson of the actual history of human rights is that they are not
so much a timeless or ancient inheritance to preserve as a recent invention to remake--or
even leave behind ... ").
60. See Sarianna M. Lundan & Peter Muchlinski, Human Rights Due Diligence in
Global Value Chains, in 7 PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH 184 (Rob
Van Tulder et al. eds., 2012). See generally Peter Lund-Thomsen & Adam Lindgreen,
Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Value Chains: Where Are We Now and Where
Are We Going?, 123 J. BUS. ETHICS 11 (2014) (discussing and critiquing protections for
workers in global value chains).
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Foregrounding "happenings in the world," framed in human rights
terms, is frequently a way of trying to cut across the white noise and
base time of nation and market.61
Within international human rights law doctrine, it is also possible to
discern effort to install some "base time" other than the vacant
passageways or indifferent cycles of national history or global economy
remarked on above. The ICCPR is, for example, strangely untimely.62
At first, the ICCPR seems hooked to a definite point in time: its
dates of adoption and entry into force. Otherwise, however, it works to
generate a patently fictional sense of States Parties' co-occurrence in
and around the "present Covenant": a temporality plainly out of step
with experience and impervious to measurement.63 Obligations in the
ICCPR are expressed in the present tense: each State Party
"undertakes" various commitments, even as the date of that initial
undertaking will have been spread across many years, even decades, as
states ratify or accede to the instrument and declare themselves subject
to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee.64
Within this "present" of the ICCPR, allowance is made for
interruptions: in "time of public emergency," certain derogations are
permitted.65 Requirements flowing from rights' recognition are also
afforded different pacing. Some steps must be taken "immediately,"
"promptly," "at the time of arrest," or "without undue delay." Others
"shall be" taken at an unspecified rate or with allowance for "adequate
time."66 Still others follow very specific calendar timings, as in the
requirement to submit reports "[w]ithin one year of the entry into force
of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned."67 At some
points in the ICCPR text, biological time seems to be exerting a
powerful undertow, literally or metaphorically: some requirements are
triggered by a child's birth, while others track the "life of the nation."68
Much of the text, however, has little if anything to do with biological
time.
These interlocking rhythms evade empiricism in precisely the way
that the timing of economic production has been shown to do. Consider
the following from Louis Althusser's portion of Reading Capital:
61. See generally Fleur Johns et al., Introduction to EVENTS: THE FORCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Fleur Johns et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how international law
makes events of certain occurrences, and the ramifications of doing so).
62. ICCPR, supra note 5.
63. Id. at art. 1(3).
64. Id. at art. 2(1)-(3).
65. Id. at art. 4(1).
66. Id. at arts. 4(3), 9(2)-(3), 14(3)(a)-(c), 24(2).
67. Id. at art. 40(1)(a).
68. Id. at arts. 4(1), 24(2).
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In the capitalist mode of production, . . . the time of
economic production has absolutely nothing to do with
the obviousness of everyday practice's ideological time:
of course, it is rooted in certain determinate sites, in
biological time, but... it is not at all identified with this
biological time, and in no sense is it a time that can be
read immediately in the flow of any given process. It is
an invisible time.. .as invisible and as opaque as the
reality of the total capitalist production process itself.
This time, as a complex "intersection" of ... different
times, rhythms, turnovers .... is only accessible in its
concept, which, like every concept is never completely
"given", [sic] never legible in visible reality: like every
concept this concept must be produced, constructed.
69
It is, nonetheless, questionable whether the work of international
human rights law since the late twentieth century has effectively
produced some "invisible" time or times through which other timings
might pass, across or against rival temporalities, in the manner of
which Althusser writes. Temporally, international human rights law
doctrine, such as that set forth in the ICCPR, is irreducible to the
composite times of nation and market, even as it occasionally evokes one
or both of those. Yet international human rights law doctrine seems too
temporally obstreperous and erratic to have become taken for granted.
Here, it works to smooth over temporal divergence in the name of some
universal time or timelessness; there, it ramps up temporal
disjunction.
70
Regardless of the success of efforts to reconfigure base time, it may
be that the contemporary prevalence of human rights claims and
consciousness has contributed to the "patterns of immediacies"
69. Althusser, supra note 22, at 101. In drawing a parallel to Althusser's notion of base
time, the intention here is not to posit a claim that the temporalities of international
human rights law or of nation-states are uniformly determined by, or responsive to, the
rhythms of the capitalist means of production. In this article, base time is employed to
elucidate temporalities that elude empiricism yet nonetheless seem to exert a metronomic
compulsion in relation to other times and timings-temporalities that may, in this
article's account, be multiple and contending.
70. See, e.g., Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127-
28 (1996) ("Dealing with the grieving, with accountability and forgiveness, and with the
rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators will . . . take time-certainly longer than the
time generally allotted for technical tasks"; yet, "[a] public airing and condemnation ...
may be the best way to draw a line between past and present, lest the public perceive the
new order as simply more of the same.").
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remarked on above. International human rights practice certainly
encourages planning: the Millennium Development Goals project
mentioned earlier is illustrative of this.71 Nonetheless, human rights
claims do seem designed for continuous time (meted out in infinitesimal
intervals), or the time of the instant, rather than for discrete time of
prescribed duration. Such claims are meant to be both ever-present
individual accompaniments and actionable, in relation to any instance
of infraction, with relative promptness.
One possible understanding of the temporality of international
human rights law doctrine and practice is that they install, or seek to
install, a "timeless.. .presence."72 That is, the attribution and bearing of
human rights might be taken to express that temporality that Hannah
Arendt regarded as characteristic of both modernity and
totalitarianism, whereby time is seized by "a superior process of
movement"73 of which individuals become "walking embodiments."7 4 In
Arendt's account, this temporal logic subordinates all individuated tasks
and intervals-including the interval of a human lifespan-to an "ever
ongoing process of purge and elimination" towards some future
condition forever in the making.75 Thus the preamble to the ICCPR
places the individual, in the present, "under a responsibility to strive for
the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant," in service of "the inherent dignity of the human person."
76
Read together with Arendt, this inherent dignity presumed by the
ICCPR seems to call forth a "deadly eternity" whereby individuals'
dignity is the natural residue of, and material for, the necessary
unfolding of the international human rights law project, rather than
something to be realized variably and agentially.
7 7
To read international human rights law's temporalities so, however,
would be to elide the sense of temporal dislocation, that they repeatedly
evoke. Into the compressed "time of public emergency," when the
71. U.N. Economic and Social Council, supra note 33.
72. 1 HANNAH ARENDT, Thinking, in THE LIFE OF THE MIND 1, 207 (Mary McCarthy ed.,
1978). I am indebted to Daniel Augenstein and Hans Lindahl for prompting me to consider
this prospect.
73. Kathrin Braun, Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault, 16 TIME &
Soc'Y 5, 12 (2007) (quoting an independently translated phrase from HANNAH ARENDT,
ELEMENTE UND URSPRUNGE TOTALER HERRScHAFT: ANTISEMITISMUS, IMPERIALISMUS,
TOTALE HERRSCAFT 952 (Piper Verlag 5th ed. 1996) (1955)).
74. HANNAH ARENDT, On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding, in
ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING: 1930-1954, at 328, 340 (Jerome Kohn ed., Schocken Books
2005) (1994).
75. Braun, supra note 73, at 13.
76. ICCPR, supra note 5, Preamble.
77. Braun, supra note 73, at 15.
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"exigencies of the situation" otherwise fill the frame, the ICCPR inserts
an atemporal "no" in the form of the "no derogation" language of Article
4(2).78 Amid the dreamy timelessness of "[a]ll persons shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals," in Article 14, one is called to pay close
attention to practicalities, including ensuring that a person facing
criminal charges has "adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his [or her] defence."79 It is possible to press much of the ICCPR into the
temporal service of nationhood, market, family, and narratives of
historical progress. Yet it is also possible to read and perform
international human rights law anachronistically and thereby to
amplify its "radical untimeliness."
80
V. THE CALL OF THE CROWD
If international human rights law doctrine and practice tend
towards the temporally unruly-perhaps even radical anachrony-they
nonetheless remain oriented towards representation and rallying.
Indeed, crucial to all the temporalities discussed so far is the prospect of
their being produced as a mode of experience. Even the elusive
temporalities of economy and nation-state must be made accessible or
recordable in some sense, however indirectly. This in turn demands that
the time or timing in question have some constituency-some people
loyal (consciously or otherwise) to that temporality's production and
reproduction.
As to how that constituency might be assembled and held together
temporally, some historical differentiation seems in order. In
international human rights law work, the period from the 1970s
through the 2000s was broadly preoccupied with human rights law's
professionalization and global inculcation. One aspect of this work was
temporal. It entailed encouraging an ever-broadening range of actors to
engage in the regular, ritualized recitation of human rights norms:
78. ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 4(1)-(2).
79. Id. at art. 14(1), (3)(b).
80. DERRIDA, supra note 6, at 25 (writing of that "anachrony on the basis of which we
are trying here to think the ghost" in the course of developing a reading of spectral
dimensions of Karl Marx's work). This article is not concerned with the historiography of
international human rights law, nor with that of international law more broadly. For this
reason, it takes no explicit part in debates to which Anne Orford has contributed her own
forceful defense of anachronism. See Anne Orford, The Past as Law or History? The
Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law (NYU Institute for International
Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2012/2 (History and Theory of International Law
Series), June 2012). See also Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law:
Significance and Problems for a Critical View, 27 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. LJ. 215, 226-32
(2013).
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through governmental and intergovernmental reporting (or
nongovernmental shadow reporting) and state submission to periodic
review, for instance, as well as through participation in seasonal cycles
of conference attendance and multilateral meeting.81 It is by such means
that more and more people have been encouraged to locate themselves
amid a progressive temporality marked out in human rights terms-to
envisage themselves moving away from rights-infringing pasts towards
rights-respecting futures.
8 2
As far as rivalry between such a rights-oriented time scale and
temporalities of nationhood is concerned, this seems to have been
intermittent. Much international human rights law work of this period
tracked the rhythms of state-to-state diplomacy, or sought to rewrite
national myth.8 3 At the same time, this work sought to instill the
perception of rights bearing as an everyday popular occurrence: as
routine for many as consumer choice (at least for those with the
requisite economic means). Moreover, international human rights law
work of these decades remained self-consciously ruptive: it was designed
to stop the clock on any "business as usual" deemed to have violated
rights.8
4
By 2010, however, it was possible to regard this work of
professionalization and routinization as largely done, human rights
having attained "ideological ascendancy," and international human
rights law's heroes, defenders, and norms attracting, in many circles,
"uncritical wonderment." 85 Henceforth, even as the above-mentioned
81. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Autumn Weekends: An Essay on Law and Everyday Life,
in LAW AND EVERYDAY LIFE 191, 191-96 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993)
(discussing the author's trip to Lisbon for an international law conference focused on East
Timor); Video Lecture by Hilary Charlesworth, Rituals and Ritualism in the International
Human Rights System, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/p
layer.aspx?id=2660 (discussing the U.N.'s role in human rights and the ritualized
dimensions of that work).
82. See Joseph R. Slaughter, Enabling Fictions and Novel Subjects: The
Bildungsroman and International Human Rights Law, 121 PMLA 1405, 1410 (2006)
(discussing a type of coming-of-age novel genre called "Bildungsroman" and discussing
how it, and modern international human rights, encourage a progressive perspective). See
generally SKOUTERIS, supra note 12.
83. See, e.g., Katharine E. McGregor, Memory Studies and Human Rights in Indonesia,
37 ASIAN STuD. REV. 350, 357-59 (2013) (discussing how Indonesian human rights
proponents reassessed late 1960s violence against communists). But see George E.
Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century: Ten Attributes of Highly
Successful Human Rights NGOs, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 165 (2010) (focusing on the
importance of non-state actors in international human rights law).
84. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 70, at 127-28.
85. MOYN, supra note 58, at 6-7.
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rituals remained ongoing, attention would turn to producing new times
in which human-rights awareness might occur and recur.
In this regard, it seems to have become harder, in recent decades, to
treat time in any register as common terrain across which all people
must pass and through which all must come to pass. The narratives of
development and progress with which international human rights law
doctrine has long been inflected do not seem to stabilize or explain to
the extent that they might once have done. In what sense, for instance,
might a young, unskilled, unemployed person in the United States, a
subsistence rice farmer in Laos, and an asylum seeker eking out the
days of a hunger strike in detention in Australia be understood to
occupy the same time scale? Where should we place these figures on a
progressive timeline ostensibly spanning the globe? Even if such
placement were possible, the passage of time often seems otherwise
contrary to the aims of human rights activists.
8 6
In the face of such challenges, as well as the decline of some forms of
nation-state temporal authority discussed above, international human
rights law doctrine and practice seem to have become somewhat less
oriented around whispering ad nauseam in the ear of political elites (in
the mode encouraged by postwar policy science).8 7 Instead, emphasis
seems to now rest upon rallying or following crowds in some here-and-
now-in a courtroom or at a protest, for instance-and maximizing the
amplitude of the instant.88 This is, it seems, to be an era for rights in
real time, or at least in some carefully sliced sections of real time.
Champions of international human rights law seem to oscillate between
appealing for a time of ubiquitous witnessing and unedited loops, and
calling for such time to be punctuated and segmented so that collective
86. See Bruce Robbins, Temporizing: Time and Politics in the Humanities and Human
Rights, BOUNDARY 2, Spring 2005, at 191, 193 ("Time protects those who are already too
well protected. And since the goal of human rights activists is to deny impunity, to bring
to account, for them ... time has been an antagonist ....").
87. Cf. Myres S. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order: A
Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 258-64 (1969) (discussing
human rights law of the time in the context of state-to-state relations and elites).
88. See Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere: Ubiquitous Video Documentation of
Human Rights, New Forms of Video Advocacy, and Considerations of Safety, Security,
Dignity and Consent, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 191, 193-94 (2010); see also Philip E. Agre,
Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process, 18 INFO. Soc'Y 311, 317, 321-22
(2002) (discussing the amplification model of internet advocacy, and the idea that
technology fosters spacing among people by providing them with individual outlets while
also allowing them to remain connected). See generally Heather Ford, Crowd Wisdom,
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Dec. 2012, at 33 (discussing an online software platform for
citizens to report human rights abuses in Kenya); Samuel Greengard, Following the
Crowd, COMM. AMC, Feb. 2011, at 20 (discussing the potential of crowdsourcing, including
as a tool for reporting on human rights abuses).
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attention may be apportioned, directed, and intensified. The former
recalls "Andy Warhol's ideal of filming real events in real time - life
isn't edited, why should its record be edited?"-an aspiration now
realized in countless blogs, remote-sensing facilities, and video diaries.
8 9
The latter seems to evoke the piecemeal concreteness, diagnostic
suggestiveness, and asocial "time depth" of the sequenced genome.90
Producing instances or streams of shareable time has always taken
work, but that work seems in many respects more difficult and less
definitive than ever. Global human rights law doctrine and practice-
specifically, the expectation that anyone, at any time, should be able to
reach for a juridical right more or less instantly fungible with others'
rights-seems both to have contributed to that difficulty and adapted to
accommodate it. At the expense of radical anachrony, international
human rights law doctrine and practice seem increasingly fixated on
maximizing accumulated "interface time"; that is, "the physical span of
time that [a] reader interacts" with a human rights-related text.91
CONCLUSION
What, then, might the prevailing impulse to sustain and occupy
"real time," as against its temporal rivals, reveal about international
human rights law work and workers today? Perhaps such "real time"
preoccupations might be regarded as symptomatic of undue orientation
toward times of crisis and associated inattention to "injustices of
everyday life," amid the desire for "immediate, intense relevance."
92
Today, however, international human rights law seems too expansive
and too settled in its occupation of the everyday for critique along these
lines to have much purchase. With so much mundane report filing and
official investigation underway worldwide, it is unclear how much of an
"alternative" an "international [human rights] law of everyday life"
might pose.93 Moreover, the "real time" that human rights would tap is
more often a source of preventative data than it is necessarily laden
with crisis. The "real time" with which recurrent contact is sought
89. Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., May 23, 2004, at
24, 27.
90. Kaja Finkler, Family, Kinship, Memory and Temporality in the Age of the New
Genetics, 61 SOC. ScI. & MED. 1059, 1065-67 (2005).
91. Marjorie C. Luesebrink, The Moment in Hypertext: A Brief Lexicon of Time, in
HYPERTEXT 98 - PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ACM CONFERENCE ON HYPERTEXT AND
HYPERMEDIA 106, 107 (Frank Shipman et al. eds., 1998).
92. Charlesworth, supra note 14, at 377, 392.
93. Id. at 377, 391.
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among international human rights law advocates is precisely the time of
the everyday, avant la crise.
More troublingly, it may be that this orientation among
international human rights law practitioners signals abandonment of
much by way of a claim to power over the longue durge-the "cadres
rdsistants"-of living and working conditions.94 Perhaps international
human rights law doctrine and practice have, for the most part, now left
the demarcation of invisible base time to the global economy, with its
"real time" gatherings, protests, and live-streams being little more than
diversions from, or elaborations on, the accelerating cadence of the
market. It certainly appears, at times, as though global concern for
capital (and temporal) redistribution might have dissipated in favor of
concern for connectivity, liquidity, risk arbitrage, and continuous
motion, the latter often explicitly rights-inflected.95 Perhaps, in the
alternative, the real time aspirations of international human rights law
work represent little more than a new iteration of the "given condition"
of state time, with a renewed thrust for national synchronicity as their
primary output. 96 Consider, for example, how the much-vaunted, crowd-
sourced happenings of the Arab Spring gave way to divergent, yet
similarly bleak, national winters.
97
There is still time, though. If such abandonment or acquiescence has
occurred, it is neither complete nor fully conceded. The base times of the
nation-state and the global economy may be invisible, but the tolls that
they sometimes exact do not go undetected. Everywhere one looks, the
"proud, angry poor" are voicing and enacting dissatisfaction.98 If the
ambition of this collection of writings is to "recover[ ] the public and
94. Fernand Braudel, Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Durde, 13 ANNALES.
ECONOMIES, SOCItT9S, CIVLISATIONS 725, 733 (1958) (Fr.).
95. Since 2011, for example, the World Bank has published a Global Financial
Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
which measures how adults in 148 countries save, borrow, make payments and manage
risk. Ash Demirguc-Kunt et al., The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial
Inclusion Around the World, (World Bank Grp. Dev. Research Grp. Fin. and Private Sector
Dev. Team, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7255, 2015), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/1F2V9ZK8CO.
96. Sassen, supra note 25, at 223.
97. See, e.g., David W. Lesch, The Arab Spring - and Winter - in Syria, 23 GLOBAL
CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 421, 422-25 (2011) (discussing Bashar al-Asad's crackdown
on the opposition in Syria); Mary Ann Tbtreault, The Winter of the Arab Spring in the Gulf
Monarchies, 8 GLOBALIZATIONS 629, 631-33 (2011) (discussing the methods the
governments of the Gulf countries used to combat Arab Spring unrest). See generally Lisa
Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2011, at 2 (2011)
(discussing the different experiences of the Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia).
98. Frances Fox Piven, A Proud, Angry Poor, THE NATION, Jan. 2, 2012, at 33, 33.
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political nature of human rights law,"99 then this may be, at least in
part, a question of reactivating the "times... [and] rhythms" of the global
economy, and of the nation-state, as political questions of the first
order.100 By way of doing so, international human rights law doctrine
and practice offer ways of experiencing the here and now
anachronistically, against the necessity of building futures or redeeming
pasts, and against the "deadly eternity" of inherent dignity.'10
99. Daniel Augenstein & Hans Lindahl, Introduction: Global Human Rights Law and
the Boundaries of Statehood, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2016).
100. Althusser, supra note 22, at 101.
101. Braun, supra note 73, at 15.
